Comments on: Back to Keith http://digitalreason.wordpress.com/2008/01/07/back-to-keith/ Toward a consistent, logical worldview. Wed, 20 Aug 2008 08:17:53 +0000 http://wordpress.org/?v=MU By: poppies http://digitalreason.wordpress.com/2008/01/07/back-to-keith/#comment-509 poppies Sat, 23 Feb 2008 01:29:50 +0000 http://digitalreason.wordpress.com/2008/01/07/back-to-keith/#comment-509 The argument is complex, I'll concede (as one would expect in the case of an almighty creator who provides for free will in his creatures), but I don't see the flaw you're seeing. The key term is "somewhat" reasonable; absurdity would indeed follow if I were arguing that it must be completely reasonable. I fail to see how an overwhelmingly powerful deity could allow for free will in any other way; the argument seems deeply without flaw. The argument is complex, I’ll concede (as one would expect in the case of an almighty creator who provides for free will in his creatures), but I don’t see the flaw you’re seeing. The key term is “somewhat” reasonable; absurdity would indeed follow if I were arguing that it must be completely reasonable.

I fail to see how an overwhelmingly powerful deity could allow for free will in any other way; the argument seems deeply without flaw.

]]> By: Arturo Munoz http://digitalreason.wordpress.com/2008/01/07/back-to-keith/#comment-508 Arturo Munoz Sat, 23 Feb 2008 01:12:17 +0000 http://digitalreason.wordpress.com/2008/01/07/back-to-keith/#comment-508 Good to be back. "Free will requires that it be somewhat reasonable to intellectually deny the existence of god" If the existence of free will requires the existence of god (as seems to be the case since if god does not exist then there is no expectation that we would have free will) and free will requires that it be somewhat reasonable to deny the existence of god then the existence of god requires that it be somewhat reasonable to intellectually deny the existence of god. This conclusion is absurd. So your argument is flawed ... unless you have an argument for free will that is independent of god. Good to be back.

“Free will requires that it be somewhat reasonable to intellectually deny the existence of god”

If the existence of free will requires the existence of god (as seems to be the case since if god does not exist then there is no expectation that we would have free will) and free will requires that it be somewhat reasonable to deny the existence of god then the existence of god requires that it be somewhat reasonable to intellectually deny the existence of god. This conclusion is absurd. So your argument is flawed … unless you have an argument for free will that is independent of god.

]]> By: poppies http://digitalreason.wordpress.com/2008/01/07/back-to-keith/#comment-506 poppies Thu, 21 Feb 2008 05:11:02 +0000 http://digitalreason.wordpress.com/2008/01/07/back-to-keith/#comment-506 Good to have you back, Arturo. My point (and John's, it seems) is basically that free will requires that it be somewhat reasonable to intellectually deny the existence of God. If God were to supernaturally intervene in human moral action in a regular, repeatable fashion, it wouldn't be reasonable to deny His existence, as the evidence would be pretty irrefutable. I'm not putting forth an argument for God in this case (though the Argument from Morality is intimately related to what I'm discussing); I'm merely showing that there is an acceptable explanation within Theism as to why Keith's hypothetical expectation is unmet (God not wishing to abrogate free will). Good to have you back, Arturo. My point (and John’s, it seems) is basically that free will requires that it be somewhat reasonable to intellectually deny the existence of God. If God were to supernaturally intervene in human moral action in a regular, repeatable fashion, it wouldn’t be reasonable to deny His existence, as the evidence would be pretty irrefutable.

I’m not putting forth an argument for God in this case (though the Argument from Morality is intimately related to what I’m discussing); I’m merely showing that there is an acceptable explanation within Theism as to why Keith’s hypothetical expectation is unmet (God not wishing to abrogate free will).

]]> By: Arturo Munoz http://digitalreason.wordpress.com/2008/01/07/back-to-keith/#comment-505 Arturo Munoz Thu, 21 Feb 2008 04:39:04 +0000 http://digitalreason.wordpress.com/2008/01/07/back-to-keith/#comment-505 "I basically said that if indeed those who would hurt a child fell into some sort of sleep just before the act, the Argument from Morality would be even stronger than it is, and I think it is one of the strongest arguments for supernaturalism and God as things are. Only the most uncomfortable of rhetorical acrobatics could explain such a sleep in any non-supernatural way " If I am not mistaken the argument goes as follows: (1) If there was an omnibenevolent god then it would make sense for him to make anyone who would hurt a child fall into some sort of deep sleep before the act. (2) People who hurt children do not fall into some sort of deep sleep ... (3) By modus tollens there is no omnibenevolent god such that it would make sense for him to make anyone who would hurt a child fall into some sort of deep ... I fail to see how you are turning this around into an argument for god. “I basically said that if indeed those who would hurt a child fell into some sort of sleep just before the act, the Argument from Morality would be even stronger than it is, and I think it is one of the strongest arguments for supernaturalism and God as things are. Only the most uncomfortable of rhetorical acrobatics could explain such a sleep in any non-supernatural way ”

If I am not mistaken the argument goes as follows:

(1) If there was an omnibenevolent god then it would make sense for him to make anyone who would hurt a child fall into some sort of deep sleep before the act.

(2) People who hurt children do not fall into some sort of deep sleep …

(3) By modus tollens there is no omnibenevolent god such that it would make sense for him to make anyone who would hurt a child fall into some sort of deep …

I fail to see how you are turning this around into an argument for god.

]]> By: john http://digitalreason.wordpress.com/2008/01/07/back-to-keith/#comment-503 john Wed, 13 Feb 2008 04:05:37 +0000 http://digitalreason.wordpress.com/2008/01/07/back-to-keith/#comment-503 Poppies, It has been some time since I have been able to comment on this page. I am excited that once again the topics of Free Will and God and the POE (problem of evil) have returned. I again propound that Keith's thought experiment is not a "experiment" that proves anything because it fails to account for actual free will. In the past discussion that you and Keith had covered the concept of belief effecting free will...I think that there is a distinction between believing and determination. Here is an excerpt of you discussion; "I find your explanation of how any divine intervention would destroy free will unsatisfactory. Take the story of Adam and Eve. Certainly, they were quite sure that God exists — they were on speaking terms after all. Yet, they were obviously free to disobey. Also, consider Moses. He came upon God in the burning bush. He heard His voice. He saw the glory of God “from behind” after God passed by. Sounds to me like Moses would have been quite sure that God exists. Do you think that destroyed his free will? And there are many more examples of individuals portrayed in the Bible as knowing that God exists, yet appearing to still have free will." Divine intervention is completely different from believing in divine power or divine existence. God can indeed appear to someone like Moses and teach him or show him what to do, but showing himself in bush does not stop Moses from sining or not doing what God would want him to do. However, if there was an actual case of "divine intervention" God would actually have to prevent an action from occurring. By that, I mean, that God would have to impede an action or/and outcome from occurring. The concept of "divine intervention" is problematic, because from a broad logical sense, if God were to intervene action X, then it seems, due to Gods abilities, that X would have never been created or brought about in the first place. This brings about the idea of pre-determinism. In response to your post, I think you are still hung up on God reveling himself and sociological/psychological views of God as grounds for the possibility of free will. However, poppies, it goes much deeper than that. Your response to Kieth was sufficient from a superficial view. The real question in play is: is free will provide a proposition that calms the inconsistency of God- omnipotence-Benevolence-evil. Keith is merely saying (unless I am wrong), since God is good, all powerful, and all-knowing, then God should prevent evil as much as he could and because he is the previous, he should be able to do so. Nevertheless, we know this is not the case because there is moral evil everywhere. Thus, by way of the "experiment" one must conclude that god is evil or he does not exist. However, the problem, as I said before, is the idea of free will. It is logically impossible to create necessarily free beings without creating free will. This is especially necessary if God has created a world that is the best possible world for us. So, if God stops an action from occurring then he has eliminated free will of that free being. Moreover, if God in anyway impedes an action from even being conceivable, he is determining actions and thus there is no free will. Keith's experiment ignors the fact that God cant stop X and still allow for free will. John Poppies,
It has been some time since I have been able to comment on this page. I am excited that once again the topics of Free Will and God and the POE (problem of evil) have returned. I again propound that Keith’s thought experiment is not a “experiment” that proves anything because it fails to account for actual free will. In the past discussion that you and Keith had covered the concept of belief effecting free will…I think that there is a distinction between believing and determination. Here is an excerpt of you discussion;
“I find your explanation of how any divine intervention would destroy free will unsatisfactory. Take the story of Adam and Eve. Certainly, they were quite sure that God exists — they were on speaking terms after all. Yet, they were obviously free to disobey. Also, consider Moses. He came upon God in the burning bush. He heard His voice. He saw the glory of God “from behind” after God passed by. Sounds to me like Moses would have been quite sure that God exists. Do you think that destroyed his free will? And there are many more examples of individuals portrayed in the Bible as knowing that God exists, yet appearing to still have free will.”
Divine intervention is completely different from believing in divine power or divine existence. God can indeed appear to someone like Moses and teach him or show him what to do, but showing himself in bush does not stop Moses from sining or not doing what God would want him to do. However, if there was an actual case of “divine intervention” God would actually have to prevent an action from occurring. By that, I mean, that God would have to impede an action or/and outcome from occurring. The concept of “divine intervention” is problematic, because from a broad logical sense, if God were to intervene action X, then it seems, due to Gods abilities, that X would have never been created or brought about in the first place. This brings about the idea of pre-determinism.
In response to your post, I think you are still hung up on God reveling himself and sociological/psychological views of God as grounds for the possibility of free will. However, poppies, it goes much deeper than that. Your response to Kieth was sufficient from a superficial view. The real question in play is: is free will provide a proposition that calms the inconsistency of God- omnipotence-Benevolence-evil. Keith is merely saying (unless I am wrong), since God is good, all powerful, and all-knowing, then God should prevent evil as much as he could and because he is the previous, he should be able to do so. Nevertheless, we know this is not the case because there is moral evil everywhere. Thus, by way of the “experiment” one must conclude that god is evil or he does not exist.
However, the problem, as I said before, is the idea of free will. It is logically impossible to create necessarily free beings without creating free will. This is especially necessary if God has created a world that is the best possible world for us. So, if God stops an action from occurring then he has eliminated free will of that free being. Moreover, if God in anyway impedes an action from even being conceivable, he is determining actions and thus there is no free will. Keith’s experiment ignors the fact that God cant stop X and still allow for free will.
John

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