I recently commented on a post which began a conversation which has really made me think about my beliefs in a new way. The post basically hypothesized about a world where God caused potential child murderers to fall into a deep sleep just before trying to carry out such an awful act. The blogger believed such a world, if it allowed for other evil, would be much more palatable than that which we currently inhabit, yet still allow for expressions of free will.
Here are some excerpts from our discussion:
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Keith - You state that “we have total freedom within the range afforded us by physical and social limitations.” To me that sounds equivalent to saying that we are not totally free, for we are free only “within the range afforded us by physical and social limitations.” Since in comment 3 above your objection against God intervening was that “[a]ny universal limitations on moral action whatsoever” would mean that we are not really totally free, I thought that “limitations” were the stumbling block. But now you admit physical and social limitations, but still claim that we have total freedom. Again I ask you to please explain, what do you mean by total freedom?
If you force me to guess what you mean, I’ll hazard you mean by “total freedom” the choice to obey or disobey God. Thus, God preventing a child’s murder would be an unacceptable limitation on the murderer’s choice to disobey God. Is that what you believe?
Also, I wish you would explain how it is that the “slightest divine disrespect of human autonomy destroys free will.” For example, would God causing someone to fall into a deep sleep destroy that person’s free will? How?
Poppies - Your guess as to my belief is very accurate. I apologize for any perceived lack of clarity; it’s a result of my taking it for granted that certain limits are taken for granted in these types of discussions.
As for the mechanism of how any divine disrespect of human autonomy destroys free will: Let’s say people did fall asleep upon intending to kill children. If this were always the case, 100% repeatable under all conditions, such a situation would basically be fairly infallible proof of God. I say “fairly” because there will always be people for whom nothing is convincing due to a mindset utterly against God, but since most people in our current world believe in God I would have to imagine this child-murder-avoiding-sleep world would cause most people to feel as if they had no choice but to obey God’s commands. The reality of God’s 3-O existence would be incredibly palpable. It’s an important aspect of free will that God remain subtle, not particularly easily accessed, and dismissable. Hopefully that’s clear, I’ve made some assumptions that I think most people would find reasonable, but if you feel I should drill down further, I’m happy to do so.
Keith - I find your explanation of how any divine intervention would destroy free will unsatisfactory. Take the story of Adam and Eve. Certainly, they were quite sure that God exists — they were on speaking terms after all. Yet, they were obviously free to disobey. Also, consider Moses. He came upon God in the burning bush. He heard His voice. He saw the glory of God “from behind” after God passed by. Sounds to me like Moses would have been quite sure that God exists. Do you think that destroyed his free will? And there are many more examples of individuals portrayed in the Bible as knowing that God exists, yet appearing to still have free will.
How can you be sure that strong evidence of God’s existence would prevent people from disobeying? Most people agree that they have an obligation to obey the laws of the state, and they certainly believe that the state exists. They also know that if they are caught they will be punished. Yet, many still break laws. Now, if you replace “state” with “God” in the above, why would people not still be free to obey or disobey?
And let me point out to you — in ancient Israel as portrayed in the Old Testament, the state was headed by God. If what you are saying were true (and the events in the Old Testament really happened as written), then Adam, Abraham, Noah, Moses, the prophets, and the whole generation that witnessed the Exodus, would have had their free will destroyed. You’re theory may make sense (to you) philosophically, but it doesn’t fit with the stories told in the Bible. Unless you take all that stuff as metaphorical, I don’t see how you can believe such a theory as a Christian.
Poppies - To be perfectly honest, I hadn’t thought about it in those terms before. I now see I can’t hold the theory I previously held. I’ll have to think about it more, because your thought experiment now takes on new meaning for me.
Keith - Now you’ve gone and done it! You’ve suprised me. I look forward to reading what you come up with.
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I’ve been thinking about this for days, and I have yet to come up with anything conclusive. If taken to it’s logical conclusion, Keith’s train of thought could end up in a world where the only freedom to express evil would be by way of thought alone; stopping at child murder seems pretty arbitrary, there’s lots of other moral evil we could do without. This obviously wouldn’t jibe with any conception of robust freedom. Yet, it does seem that a pretty large amount of divine intervention could occur without destroying free will.
These ideas have really rocked some long-held conceptions of mine. It will be interesting to see how this ends up. I feel like I’m going mad! 
April 18, 2007 at 9:38 pm
[...] 18th, 2007 by keithwerner Poppies at Digital Reason has blogged about my post God — A Thought Experiment. Apparently I’m driving him mad. I’ll [...]
April 19, 2007 at 10:59 am
Keith’s argument is committing a number of fallacies. First, he is appealing to emotion, second, he is appealing to ignorance and third he is committing a non-causa analogy. Notwithstanding such fallacies, I object to his claims.
I will object to his claim that God must be responsible for interceding for any moral situation. His example and objections are as follows:
This explanation, however, does not work. Recall when you imagined having superpowers. You had the power to put Mr. Mock Turtleneck into a deep sleep, allowing you to rescue the girl easily and without risk. Would doing so turn Mr. Turtleneck into a zombie? Every night we sleep and every day we awaken without being stripped of our free will, inhuman zombies. Perhaps an omniscient and omnipotent God would allow people to choose evil, but for what reason should He allow an innocent to come to mortal harm? Why, when instead, He could both allow Mr. Turtleneck to choose evil and intervene to prevent harm to the girl? At the point that the villain is about to make the final choice to attack and kill, God could overcome him with sleep and take the girl out of harm’s way. This would not turn anyone into an automaton.
Keith provides an interesting point; however, it is ignoring some interesting objections. The free will defender claims that if one were to eliminate free will completely everyone would be a zombie. This claim is true, because if the ability to choose X or Y were eliminated or determined then we could not freely decide either antecedent X or Y. We must then be controlled or all of our actions determined. However, in accordance with the objection provided by Keith this same principle applies. Lets imagine a world that when any evil occurs (such as the one in the example above) it is prevented or interrupted. Now, in such world where evil, like murder is interrupted, an omnipotent being would have to prevent moral goods from occurring because a world in which even the most atrocious evils are prevent also cause the most benevolent goods to be prevented. In such world were God allows men to be even moderately free is to bring about the existence of moral good (which any omni benevolent creature would desire), but if God brings about free will and moral good he must allow for moral evil if we are truly to be free (even to a moderate extent). More broadly if murder X is free with respect to A, then God cannot bring it about or cause it to be that A be the case either that X takes or refrains from A. Because if God intervenes on the possibility of A to occur, then he has determine the action of X. Thus, by claiming that by putting Murder X to sleep… because of that intervention he will not realize A his free will is limited. Furthermore, if a person limits A it also has the possibility of limiting future moral goods. For example, perhaps the police that stop or catch this man are able to figure out better ways to catch criminals via new methods, perhaps the parents of the child after the initial set of anger forgive the murder and develop a divine type mercy, perhaps the position will implement new laws to prevent future evils, perhaps the murders family become touched in such a way to help educate the community to prevent further occurrences. This example demonstrates that along with such an evil there is the possibility of positive and morally ameliorating consequences that could only have occurred under the affects of such an evil. Thus, a possible justification for evil could be realized.
Another claim that seems to be flawed in the argument provided by Keith is that its ok for God to determine the acts of murders but its ok for men to commit lesser evils like fornication, kicking a dog (abuse of non sentient beings), destroy the eco system. To say this almost commits a slippery slope. If God must determine the actions of a murder he must intervene, however, if God is omniscient he would have already known that murder X would commit evil A. thus, God should have never have created murderer X in the first place. Because by creating X he has committed an evil, via the creation of a murderer. It would thus follow that God is morally obligated to not create murders. Now, if God were morally obligated to not create murders because of their evil acts, God would therefore cause a ripple effect in the free will of many more sentient beings. This is due to the idea that if God creates no murders he must not allow the creation of all creatures that commit evil, or God is not omni benevolent because his is allowing the existence of evil. Therefore, he either must refrain from the creation of all evil creatures or not allow creatures to be truly free. This argument demonstrates that God cannot actualize a free world without such moral evils…even murder. (Therefore, he must allow such evils if we are to be free)
To conclude, the free will defender asserts that it is logically possible for God to create a world that is both morally free and free of all moral evil. From that, it follows, that the case with the murder could not have been impeded or the free will of such a person would have been determined along with the free will of many others. Moreover, to determine the evil acts of all evil people we eliminate the possibility for the existence of second-degree moral goods.
thank you,
John
April 19, 2007 at 12:02 pm
I think Keith’s line of thought here is very productive. It does lead to the conclusion that one can be aware of God, and still choose a different path. One can also imagine a God who acts directly, and still see that same separation.
So then, the question becomes not why does God allow evil, but why does God allow unnecessary evil? One solution to the problem of evil I happen to be quite fond of is the idea of lasting and non lasting consequences. So if this life is not our only life, and we can learn from the mistakes we make, and the mistakes of others, then evil becomes a learning tool. A teacher’s aide. One must cast away any conception of eternal punishment for this line of thought to work.
To what degree is free will dependent upon knowledge and fear? If a man is raised his whole life to believe random murder is moral, is he really freely choosing to be evil? If a man is raised to fear the consequences of murder, is he freely choosing to be good?
April 19, 2007 at 11:36 pm
i am not in any way as knowledgeable as you folks in this subject matter (read: minimal research) so forgive me if i ask questions that seem cliché, have long been answered or are a little off the subject.
Take a robot ( the idea is a human devoid of emotions ) that is programmed with directives to acquire knowledge regarding sanctity of life and morals and evil and death. or say the complete teachings of the bible. Bear with me please.
This robot is then to proceed through a series of experiences that would expose it to situations where it is required to make use of its acquired knowledge as a basis for deciding what actions to take.
Would it be possible for the robot to execute a decision that goes against its teachings?
Would not the robot always conclude with an action that reflects the values of its indoctrinations?
Will that still be considered free will?
and more importantly how much of a role does emotion play in free will and the decisions we make?
would taking away our emotions be equal to taking away our free will or power to decide?
Are these two traits intrinsically linked?
i do not want to point out more than i have to as i would write through the night.
to bring up one last thought though, which might be moot but i feel should be included. Since the robot right out the box, figuratively speaking, does not come preloaded with specific instructions what basis would it have to construct any legitimate reason to decide if it would like to accept the program or not?
Is free will a concept that only exists for certain purposes, similar to the concept of infinity, and is an impractical notion in real life?
I hope to sort this out somewhat with your assistance.
April 20, 2007 at 9:07 am
Fitnessfortheoccasion,
By being aware of God, one can always choose a different path. However, if God intercedes to prevent every action then the ability to chose any event which could possibly bring about an evil, must then be prevents. If that occurs then many good events that are dependant upon choices that cause evil are also prevented. Finally, if that occurs then free will is abolished. For that reason we have reason to believe that Keith’s argument really fails to address the true state of will. It is clearly an appeal to ignorance.
And about unnecessary evil, here is a proof that I have been working on that proves the necessity of natural and unnecessary evil: (usually natural evil is considered unnecessary because moral evil is the out come of free chosen events)
1. Agent (A) exists in a world governed by natural laws (N), which are necessary for the existence of A.
2. N bring about situations of natural evil (NE)
3. A utilizes free will to discover the only possible solution to overcome or prevent NE.
4. By overcoming or preventing NE, agent learns concept Z.
5. Concept Z has morally significant qualities.
6. Thus, it is necessary that NE exist for Z to be obtained by A.
According to Plantiga’s idea of counterfactuals it is logically impossible to impede evil, and allow for moral good because of free will. To really prove that God can stop evil and allow for agency is going to take more than a non-causa argument; he is going to need a proof to establish any possible logic validity to his claims.
John
April 20, 2007 at 4:33 pm
Maxaside, it’s typical for theists to make a distinction between the will and emotions. There’s certainly cases where a person of sound mind can make decisions that aren’t rational, that the decider’s emotions are against, and yet they will to do so anyway. A good example would be someone taking a bullet for a stranger. These sorts of actions are difficult for evolution to explain, since evolution would imply fairly deterministic explainations for all human decisions.
John, I think you’re missing that free will could conceivably still exist if God prevents all evil but a small, small amount. The question then becomes, why doesn’t He limit things more extremely? It doesn’t intuitively make sense to me that He would limit things more than He does, but I can’t think of a logical reason why He wouldn’t since He could prevent lots more evil and still not abolish free will.
April 20, 2007 at 8:33 pm
Poppies,
I have addressed that question, but let me rephrase. Nelson Pike makes a distinction between 1st degree evils and 2nd degree evils. One could call 1st degree goods “simple goods” and 1st degree evils “simple evils” and 2nd degree “greater goods” and 2nd evils “greater evils.” If God abolishes all second-degree evils and only allows 1st degree then he abolishes all second-degree goods. If that is true then he eliminated all actions prescribed to 2nd degree evils and second-degree goods. Thus, he would eliminate goods –making God malevolent—and not only that, but he would have put limits on free will, thus, men would no longer be free.
It is not Logically possible for God to allow free will and limit moral evil to whatever extent. Unless, he determines some actions to not allow greater evils, but doing that he then causes the loss of greater goods. It’s a ripple effect; you can’t determine parts of X and expect the whole to be complete. (Axioms 1-5)
April 20, 2007 at 8:53 pm
Thanks, John. Not meaning to be disrespectful, but sometimes I have trouble following your grammar. Your last comment makes your position much more clear to me. You apparently believe that for every evil action, necessarily an equally good result arises, which I question, but perhaps you have evidence for this you have yet to mention. I wonder, do you believe in the opposite, that good actions result in equally evil results? If not, why does it only go in one direction?
April 21, 2007 at 11:16 am
I am sorry. I start to think and I end up throwing out a plethora of statements that are confusing. Let me try and make this comment more clear.
The concept of evil (or the understanding of what evil is) can only logically is brought about by the existence of goods. However, I don’t believe that for every action a good arises, but rather for every evil there is a counter-conditional good that already exist. This ‘good’ that already exist, is ascertained by men to help overcome or remedy the evil that is being experienced by agents. Furthermore, it is not only about goods being countered by evils or visa versa, but rather causal action. The following proof supports this idea:
1. If God limits or prevents the result of a cause, he must prevent the occurrence of the cause itself.
2. If god prevents the occurrence of a cause, then he must limit the causal initiator ‘CI’ (Agents).
3. To limit the CI, God must limit the ability of the CI to initiate or act, so that the cause cannot occur.
4. Therefore, the CI (to be limited) is not truly free.
Lets look at the various premises. (1) Evil is the result of an act by a free moral agent. It is therefore possible that evil is the outcome of a cause. To limit evil God must prevent its occurrence. (2-3) Since agents (CI) cause evils because of their chouses that bring about causes, God would have to limit their choices. (4) We find that if evil actions are limited the decisions that bring about causes that cause evil must be eliminated; to do this God must severely limit or not allow free will.
April 21, 2007 at 4:58 pm
Okay, John, I’m with you; you hold the exact theory I used to hold which was blown to smithereens by Keith’s discussion. Check out what I mean:
1. If man is a physical being, any given human will is limited by physical reality.
2. If man is a social being, any given human will is limited by society.
3. Man is a physical and social being.
3. Therefore, human will is limited due to the human condition.
And:
1. Human will is limited.
2. Human will can be described as free.
3. Therefore, will is free even when limited.
So, why wouldn’t God want to severely limit, but not eradicate, free will in order to minimize evil? It seems that people who subscribe to the free will defense must not just show how will must be free, but must be robustly free. I haven’t yet seen a reason why this must be, though it seems intuitively correct to me.
April 21, 2007 at 7:47 pm
Poppies,
I have read your discussion, and I don’t think that you were “blow to smithereens.” Rather, he just threw out a straw man and you attacked it while he remained safe behind his original weekend argument.
Your proof follows a valid path, yet the soundness of (1) is questionable due to the definition of physical creatures. A response can be as follows:
1. Since men are physically composed, they are free to all physical things.
2. The world is physically composed
3. Thus, any willed desire in a physical world is possible.
What you have committed is a naturalistic fallacy. The premise is reflecting something outside of men’s possibility. Thus, free will cannot compose extra-world existence or omnipotent desires etc because we are part of a free physical world. All physical things are possible, but it is not natural or realistic to suppose extra world things that are not possible for men would be reason to dismiss the free will of men.
Furthermore, premise (2) is speculative at best. Society says that you cannot have sex with a thirteen-year-old girl, but society cannot limit your free will by stopping you. It is objectively true that people can decide to go and have sex with 13-year-old girls and succeed in completing that objective without being stopped by society. To say that society is going to stop free will because of societal standards or punishment is a post hoc argument. Which gives us reason to accept the validity thereof.
Moreover, the second argument creates an inconsistency between 1 and 2. Freedom that is said to be limited cannot be described as free, so if the argument remains as it is, then it is false.
Ps. Again, if you get a chance read Alvin Plantinga’s book “God, Freedom and Omnipotence.” His arguments are quite solid.
April 21, 2007 at 8:15 pm
Vey good points, John. I’m not yet sure I agree with all your premises, but I’m so glad you contributed, I feel I’m coming to a “consonance”, moving away from the mental dissonance I’ve been experiencing.
April 21, 2007 at 8:18 pm
Poppies,
thank you for the invite. I loved the discussion.
April 30, 2007 at 8:17 am
I should have replied here sooner, but I’ve been a little bit out of it lately. I have replied to John’s comment to my post here: http://keithwerner.wordpress.com/2007/03/27/god-a-thought-experiment/#comment-21
Here, I’ll defend myself a little from John’s charges that I’ve committed a number of fallacies.
First, he says that I’m appealing to emotion. I’m guessing (since he doesn’t specify) that he’s objecting to the vivid description of the little innocent girl being threatened with murder. While it’s true that evoking images of little endangered children would be fallacious if used to buttress an argument otherwise lacking valid logic, the mere presence of such imagery doesn’t make an argument fallacious all by itself. In this case, I’m using this scenario to make the problem of evil more vivid and immediate, in the hope that theists will take it more seriously than it seems to me they often do.
Since I didn’t state any argument in a formal syllogistic form, I can see how someone could think that it’s all an appeal to emotion: “Look at this little girl! Surely you would help her if you could! God can! But He doesn’t! Therefore, God doesn’t exist.
Well, I never claimed the experiment was proof. I offered it as evidence, in the hopes of getting readers to think seriously about the problem. I think it could be restated as a formal argument, in a way that would avoid simply appealing to emotion. I’ll write something up this week.
Second, John says that I’m appealing to ignorance. I wish he would explain to what he’s referring, since he just throws that out. Perhaps he’s referring to the final few paragraphs of the post, where I respond to the “God does have a plan but we can’t understand it so we must have faith” defense of God’s inaction. But that would be quite unfair, since I acknowledge the virtue of admitting to what we don’t know. It would be nice if he could clarify.
Third, John asserts that I’m “committing a non-causa analogy.” Again, I wish he would explain what he is objecting to, simply and directly. I found an entry in Wikipedia for “non causa pro causa” fallacies. (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Questionable_cause) I really don’t know which of these fallacies he thinks I committed or where. Maybe he will tell us.
John also states that he “object[s] to [my] claim that God must be responsible for interceding for any moral situation.” Where did I claimed that God must intercede in *any* moral situation? Does “any” here mean “every” or does it mean “some?” I certainly never claimed that God must intercede in “every” moral situation. I did implicitly claim that God should intervene in “some” moral situations, which I would think is an uncontroversial claim, given that most people take God to be supremely good. And anyway, isn’t that whole salvation plan through incarnation and crucifixion a case of intervening in a moral situation? Does John object to any claims about why God did that, or that He might have felt responsible?
I have more to say, but comment is getting long, so I’ll continue in another.
April 30, 2007 at 8:57 am
John above states that “Keith provides an interesting point; however, it is ignoring some interesting objections. The free will defender claims that if one were to eliminate free will completely everyone would be a zombie.”
It may be vanity, but I would like to know what that interesting point is.
I’d like to point out, though, that the second sentence (”The free will defender claims….”
amounts to a tautology. If you eliminated free will *completely*, of course we would all be zombies. That’s pretty much the definition of a zombie. The issue is not whether God should *completely* eliminate our free will in order to stop evil, but whether He could not selectively place certain limits on our actions without making us automatons. For example, if He should choose to cause a would-be murderer to fall asleep just before the final fall of the knife and thereby save his victim, would that turn the would-be murderer into an automaton? I don’t see why, and nothing that John has written has helped explain it. And just to be clear, I’m not offering my ignorance on this point as proof of anything. I’d really like someone to explain it, as simply and directly as possible.
Also, John states that “Rather, he [Keith] just threw out a straw man and you [poppies] attacked it while he remained safe behind his original weekend argument.” Vanity again, but could John please to where this straw man is. Also, I checked the dates of the post, and only one comment from me was made on a weekend, so characterizing it as a “weekend argument” seems a little odd.
Above, John gives an argument thus:
“1. Since men are physically composed, they are free to all physical things.
2. The world is physically composed
3. Thus, any willed desire in a physical world is possible.”
(Is there a way of doing block quotes in comments?) The first premise makes no sense to me — I wish John would explain it. What does “free to all physical things” mean? How does that follow from people being physical bodies? Also, the conclusion that “any willed desire in a physical world is possible” seems indefensible. There are many desires that people have that are not possible precisely because we are physical beings of a particular sort. We cannot fly like a bird, breath underwater like a fish, regenerate like Wolverine, lift thousands of tons like Superman. Please explain.
May 1, 2007 at 3:11 pm
Keith,
I don’t think you understand what an appeal to emotion is. It dose not require a syllogism or some proof. Any argument can contain fallacies not just a proof. Your previous explanation for how this fallacy was used is wrong.
The following comment is already on your webpage.
I would like to press the idea of causes and the association they have with moral evil. Evils exist– both moral and natural (1). Goods exist –both moral and natural (2).
(1) and (2) also contain certain degrees of evil and good. Lets say the situations of evil that are or resemble, vice, jealousy, envy, simple loss, minor physical pain, or simple malicious acts, are considered 1st degree evils. Whereas acts such as: simple hate, murder, rape, genocide, terrible physical pain, sever loss, or terrible emotional pain, are known as 2nd degree evils. So, we have (for arguments sake) 1st degree evils (1E) and second-degree evils (2E) that are present in (1). The same concept applies for (2). There are 1st degree goods (1G) that are brought about by 1st degree evils, and necessarily the same would hold for 2nd degree goods (2G).
Now, before I continue with this line of thought, let me state that the conclusion of your argument, if I am not mistaken, is:
Since God is omnipotent he should be able to prevent the results of evil action by intervening and still allow the occurring cause.
Let assume that that conclusion were possible, and if it were the question that arises is: would the existence of (1G) and (2G) exist if results of evil actions, which brings about (1E) and (2E), were to be eliminated?
The cases (1G) and (2G) are logically made possible by the existence of (1E) and (2E); this is analogous for hot and could or any other counter-dependant. So if God even so much as limits any action or result that is caused, or that will bring about (1E) then he must allow that (1G) not exist. The same follows for (2E)–>(2G). Thus, God cannot result of any evil event without eliminating goods.
Your claim that God ’should’ intercede to stop evil actions from occurring is still an argument from ignorance. Why should he? What reasons would God have to bring that about? Is it because it would be better that the actions of men be determined moderately? Can you provide a reason for why?
However, that is beside that point let us move on to why your conclusion is erred when discussing freedom and causes.
It is actually a very simple concept. Alvin Plantinga in “God, Freedom and Evil” addresses that exact claim, and refutes it. That is why the atheologian is no longer attacking that concept but rather the existence of natural evil or unnecessary evil.
Plantinga states that if God is to make one refrain from bringing about the result of their action then that person is not truly free. Thus God is determining the actions of free agents. If God determines the actions of some free agents then the parts of the whole are not free. Thus logically the whole itself is not free. (This seems to be derived from the logical concept Axiom 5)
To further the idea of Plantinga and Nelson Pike, I assert that if God were to limit evil by divinely interceding, then he would also have to not only limit the result but the cause that is bringing about any evil result because actions that bring about evil are evil themselves, he would therefore have to stop any evil action (I say any because God could not merely chose to limit certain evils and allow others and remain omni benevolent. Thus, if god is to limit any result he must limit all results in ore to remain wholly good).
You have not correctly thought out the causal events that would proceed if God were to limit all evil result. If he were to do so would moral evil exist? The answerer is no. And we know that it is logically impossible to actualize a world containing morally free agents without the existence of moral evil (see: Alvin Plantinga “God, Freedom and Evil”).
May 1, 2007 at 9:21 pm
John said this, quote:
Keith,
I don’t think you understand what an appeal to emotion is. It dose not require a syllogism or some proof. Any argument can contain fallacies not just a proof. Your previous explanation for how this fallacy was used is wrong.
*******************************
I wasn’t claiming above that my thought experiment couldn’t have been a fallacious appeal to emotion because it wasn’t in the form of a formal syllogistic proof. Rather, I admitted that I could see how someone could think that it was a fallacious appeal to emotion, since it wasn’t in the form of a formal syllogistic proof. I then said I would try rewriting it to make it clear that it wasn’t not simply an appeal to emotion. I’ll still intend to do this, and maybe when I get it posted you’ll understand what I’m saying.
I’ll respond to the rest of this comment at my blog, where John originally posted it.
John, I asked a number of questions above, which you didn’t answer. Such as, what does “free to all physical things” mean? I also pointed out that the issue isn’t whether God should make us all zombies, but whether if God placing any limits whatsoever on the evil we can do would *totally eliminate* our free will.
I also asked you to specify where I “throw out a straw man” and how you could defend the claim that “any willed desire in a physical world is possible.” Additionally, I asked you to clarify what kind of “non-causa analogy” you think I made and where. This would help me to respond to your comments. I look forward to hearing your answers.
May 26, 2007 at 10:40 am
This has been a very interesting blog. I for one am a fan of free will, and I think I agree with John on this matter. However, he seems to have confuses what the real point is here. Keith, you are missing one logical truth that the whole is the sum of its parts. Consider this:
1. If God were to limit moral evil, then he must eliminate or control the desires of any agent (A) that were to cause such moral evil.
2. If God were to control or eliminate the desires of actions of A, then A’s free will must also be controlled or eliminated.
3. Thus, the free will that A possesses has been controlled or eliminated.
You see, for every person whose actions are determined their free will must be controlled, hence they are not free. Or, eliminated.
I think John’s insight into 1st degree and 2nd degree goods and their dependence on the existence of free will was very interesting.
Matt